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COURT-MARTIAL SENTENCES DURING

THE WAR
ENOCH H. CROWDER1

[A study of sentence-periods for the several criminal offenses is one
of the rarest things to be found in the annals of penology. The most extensive one available, for recent years, is that presented in Table 42 of the
1910 Census volume "Prisoners and Juvenile Delinquents, in the United
States" (published in 1918) ; but even that one is not sufficiently detailed
for certain important purposes.
All the more valuable scientifically, therefore, arb the data of courtmartial sentences presented in two recent letters of the judge Advocate
General of the Army, on the subject of "Military Justice During the War."
The first letter was published in the U. S. Official Bulletin for March 10,
1919; the second letter was published as a pamphlet, by the War Department, on March 29, 1919. Both letters cover substantially the same ground,
as to sentences of courts-martial; but each contains important data and
comments not given in the other. Moreover, the two may not be
readily accessible to all students of this subject. For this reason it has
been deemed worth while to reproduce here, for permanent enbodiment
among the records of criminal science, those parts of the two letters, placed
consecutively, which deal with court-martial sentences.
The letters refer, once or twice, to a more extensive tabulation forming the basis of the statistics here abstracted in summary. This tabulation
remains as yet in manuscript, in the office of the Secretary of War, to
whom the letters were addressed.
It will be understood that the letters from which these passages are
reprinted were written to the Secretary of War, presenting data upon
topics of military justice which had been the subject of public criticism
in Congress and elsewhere.-J. H. W.]
I.

SEVERITY OF SENTENCES

In considering the severity of sentences (and this topic has been
the main theme of the criticisms uttered on the floor of Congress) I
must make my comments in the following order:
(a) The sentences as they have actually been imposed;
(b) The reasons for those sentences; and
(c) The measures now taken to give proper mitigation or
remission of sentences.
(a) The Sentences Actually Imposed-In considering the severity of sentences, it is, of course, necessary to examine separately the
'Major General, U. S. A.; Judge Advocate General of the Army.
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different offenses, since obviously the appropriate punishment varies
widely for offenses of different moral culpability and different danger
to military discipline. Space does not permit me here to set forth the
facts for all of the offenses and sentences covered by the general
• courts-martial since April 6.
I handed to you on February 12, a complete table of data as to
the length of sentences, for the period October, 1917, to September,
1918, covering the nine principal military offenses of desertion, absence without leave, sleeping on post, assaulting an officer or noncommissioned officer, disobeying an officer or a non-commissioned
officer, mutiny, and disobeying a general order or regulation.2

TABLE I-SENTENCE PEI0DS FOR THE NINE PRINCIPAL MILITARY
OCTOBER, 1917, SEPTEMBER, 1918

OFFENSES,

October 1, 1917, to September 30, 1918
Number of
court-martial
sentences
Oct. 1. 1917 to
Sept. 30, 1918

Offenses

Total Offenses ................
Desertion .....................

Total years
of
sentences

Average
sentence
in years

12,472
2,025

15,35420

7.58

Sleeping on Post..............

609

894.50

1.47

Assault; Attempt to Assault...
Officer ......................

173
31

462.34
12725

2.87
4.10

51

404.50

7.93

1,404
208
1,196

4,986.94
406.72
4,580.22

3.55
1.96
3.83

Officer ....................

785

3,330.99

4.24

N. C. 0 ...................

411

1,24923

3.04

Absence Without Leave .......

N. C. 0 .....................

Mutiny .......................
Disobedience, Disrespect,

Dis-

loyalty ..................
Regulations .................
Orders ......................
Miscellaneous, Forgery,
ceny, etc ................

3,362

142

5,361.39

335.09

1.59

2.36

Lar4,848

2,[As this table is too lengthy for inclusion here, the national summaries
for the year are alone given; omitting the part showing distribution by months
and by jurisdictions.-D.]
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Desertion (Table I, No. 1)-No one can approach the sub(1)
ject of sentences for desertion in time of war without keeping in mind
the solemn and terrible warning recorded expressly for our benefit by
Brig. Gen. Oakes, acting assistant provost marshal general for Illinois,
as set forth in his report printed in the Report of the Provost Marshal
General for the Civil War (Part II, p. 29). In impressive language
he lays the following injunction upon us:
Incalculable evil has resulted from the clemency of the government
toward deserters. By a inercifid severity at the commencement of the
war the mischief might have been nipped in the bud, and the crime of
desertion could never have reached the gigantic proportions which it
attained before the close of the conflict. The people were then ardent and
enthusiastic in their loyalty, and would have cheerfully and cordially assented to any measures deemed necessary to the strength and integrity of
the Army. They had heard of the "rules and articles of war," and were
fully prepared to see * * * that deserters from the Army would be
remorsely arrested, tried by court-martial, and, if guilty, be forthwith
shot to death with musketry.
This was unquestionably the almost universal attitude of the public
mind when hostilities began, and the just expectations of the people should
not have been disappointed. Arrest, trial, and execution should have been
the short, sharp, and decisive fate of the first deserters. * * * The Government was far behind the people in this matter, and so continued, until
long and certain impunity had thrown such swarms of deserters and
desperadoes into every State that it was then too late to avert the calamity.
* * * I state these things so that, if we have another war, the Governmnent mnay start right * * * put deserters to death, enforce military law,
strike hard blows at the outset, tone up the national mind at once to a
realization that war is war; and be sure that such a policy will be indorsed
and sustained by the people.
There are other suggestions to be made in respect to deserters, but the
one I have already advanced-the non-indorsement of the penalties provided by the military code for the crime of desertion, especially at the
beginning-is, beyond all question, the grand fundamental cause of the
unparalleled increase of that crime, and of the inability of district provost
marshals, with their whole force of special agents and detectives, to rid
the country of deserters.
This solemn warning was naturally in our minds at the opening
of the present war. But, in spite of its urgency, it was decided to
exhibit our faith in the American people, and to place our trust in
that loyalty and devotion to duty which we felt sure would characterize the vast majority of to-day's young American manhood. We
believed that the "short, sharp, and decisive fate of the first deserters" should not be the extreme penalty as urged by Gen. Oakes.
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And the view was generally accepted in the Army that terms of
imprisonment should be ordinarily deemed the adequate repressive
measure for the few who might need it. And it is a fact that of the
(approximately) 3,000 convictions for desertion, during the war, the
sentence of death was imposed in only 24 cases, and in every such
case it was commuted or remitted.
It must, therefore, be kept in mind at the outset that the refusal
to adopt the policy of death sentences for desertion was in itself a
repudiation of the policy of extreme severity; and that the practice of
limiting desertion sentences to terms of imprisonment is in itself
the adoption of a policy of leniency. Reproach for severity must
deal with the fact that the policy adopted disregarded both the
extreme penalty authorized by Congress and the warnings of the
Civil War.
Turning, then, to the recorded facts, we find in the table that the
total number of convictions for desertions for the year October,
1917-September, 1918, was 2,025; that the average sentence was 7.58
years; that nearly 24 per cent of these sentences were for less than
2 years; that 64 per cent were for less than 10 years; and that only
35.90 per cent were for a greater period than 10 years. The Article
of War reads:
Any person who deserts shall, if the offense be committed in time of
war, suffer death, or such other punishment as the court-martial may direct.,
It would'seem, therefore, that in point of severity the result of
courts-martial sentences for desertion can not be charged with erring
on the side of severity.
You will notice that I do not here attempt to account for the
justice of individual cases. Certain of the sentences for 25 years, or
even for lesser periods, are open to criticism as excessively severe
under the circumstances of the individual case. But it must be
kept in mind that these trials and sentences were found legally valid
by the Judge Advocate General's Office; that the only issue of doubt
that could arise concerns the quantum- of the sentence; and that the
scrutiny of the clemency section in the Military Justice Division of
the office may be relied upon to detect cases of excessive severity
before any excessive portion of such a sentence has been served. But
the excessive severity of an individual sentence is not the question
here; that question would call for the scrutiny of the particular case.
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The question here is of general conditions. What the above figures
show in respect to general conditions, or the trend of conditions, is
that the practice has been one of relatively moderate penalties instead
of the severest one permissible under the law.
'(2)
Absence without leave (Table I, No. 2)-Absence without
leave is an offense which represents, in many instances, cases of actual
desertion; but, owing to the movements of the military unit and thus the
difficulty of obtaining the necessary technical proof, the actual deserter
is frequently convicted of no more than an absence without leave. It
is, therefore, plain that the offense of absence without leave may,
upon its circumstances, merit an extremely severe penalty, equal to
that of desertion. In time of war this offense may lawfully be punished by any penalty short of death; in time of peace a presidential
order limits the maximum penalty to six months' confinement.
For the year ending September, 1918, the total convictions for this
offense number 3,362; the average sentence was 1.59 years (or only
three times the small maximum allowed in peace times) ; 11 per cent
of the offenses received no penalty of imprisonment; 67 per cent
received a sentence of less than two years imprisonment; and only
22 per cent received a penalty of more than two years in prison.
When it is remembered, as above pointed out, that this offense is in
many cases virtually the offense of an actual deserter, it will be seen
that the number of the sentences over two years is not disproportionate to the probable ratio of cases individually calling for the
higher penalties. An average sentence of 1.59 years for this offense,
committed in time of war, can not be deemed an exhibition of severity, where in fact the act of Congress establishing the Articles of
War leaves the court-martial absolutely untrammelled (short of the
death sentence) in the penalty to be fixed to this offense.
(3)
Sleeping on post (Table I, No. 3)-The offense of sleeping
on post is punishable by death in time of war, and in time of peace
"any punishment except death that a court-martial may direct." There
were two sentences of death imposed by courts-martial in France for
sleeping on post in the zone of operations and in the front-line trenches;
those two individual cases I have already commented on in the first
part of this letter. Of the whole 609 convictions, some 575 of the
offenses took place in the United States, where it may be supposed that
the highest penalty suitable for forces engaged with the enemy would
hardly be applicable. And it is a fact that of the entire 575 there
was only one sentence over 15 years and only four sentences over 10
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years. For 10 per cent of the sentences no imprisonment at all was
prescribed; for 62.40 per cent of the sentences, the period imposed was
less than 2 years; and all told, only 27.42 per cent of the sentences
were for more than two years. Having in view the maximum provisions of the Articles of War, it seems plain that the treatment of this
offense by courts-martial can scarcely be called a harsh one.
(4)
Assaulting a superior officer (Table I, No. 4)-The offense
of assaulting an officer is punishable, under the Articles of War, by
"Death or such other punishment as the court-martial might direct";
and this irrespective of a state of war or of peace. The total convictions for this offense were only 31, giving an average sentence of 4.10
years; nearly 50 per cent of them being for a period of less than
2 years. Again, one may say that in the face of the capital punishment expressly authorized as a maximum by the Articles of War,
courts-martial have not followed a practice which may be characterized as harsh or severe.
(5)
Assaulting a noncommissioned officer (Table I, No. 5)The offense of assaulting a noncommissioned officer is liable to "any
punishment that the court-martial may direct"; and this irrespective
of a state of peace or war. The total number of such convictions was
132; the average sentence was 2.36 years; more than 6 per cent were
punished without imprisonment, and more than 57 per cent were punished by imprisonment of less than 2 years. There are half a dozen
sentences for upwards of 10 years; the justification for these must
rest upon their individual circumstances. But the average sentence
of 2.36 years, compared with the maximum allowable under the
Articles of War, can not be admitted to exhibit a general disposition
to severity, but quite the contrary.
(6) Disobeying a noncommissioned officer (Table I, No. 6)The disobedience of the lawful order of a noncommissioned officer is
by the Articles of War placed under the same penalty as the assaulting
of a noncommissioned officer, that is, the court-martial has complete
discretion in choosing the penalties, except that of death. The total
number of convictions was 411, and the average sentence was 3.04
years; 8.27 per cent of sentences gave no period of imprisonment; 50
per cent gave a period of less than 2 years.
In itself, this average sentence, comparing it with the maximum
allowed by the Articles of War, can not be referred to as a severe one.
It is notable, however, that this offense of disobeying a noncommissioned officer, received a higher average sentence, viz., 3.04 years,
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than the apparently more heinous one of assaulting a noncommissioned
officer, viz., 2.36 years. It may be admitted that some explanation remains to be sought for this apparently anomalous result, but it can
be pointed out here that the disobedience of a noncommissioned officer
is often of a deliberate character making the offense a highly serious
one, whereas the offense of assaulting an officer is often the result
merely of a quick temper without any deliberate intention of resistance
to authority, and that it thus deserves considerate attention by the
tribunal.
(7) Mutiny (Table I, No. 7)-There were 51 convictions for
mutiny; the average sentence was 7.93 years; 27 per cent fell between
2 and 3 years, and 43 per cent fell between 10 to 15 years; the other
sentences scattering over the various percentages. The Articles of
War provide that a person guilty of mutiny "shall suffer death or such
other 'punishment as the court-martial may direct," irrespective of a
state of peace or war. When committed in its most significant form,
it is, of course, the most heinous offense of a soldier. But it may
also be committed under much less culpable circumstances. In short,
it gives an opportunity for the widest range of discretion in the imposition of sentences. This inherent quality is reflected in the wide
range of sentences actually imposed. In view of the fact that, in an
army numbering more than 3,000,000 men at the time covefed by these
records, there were only 51 offenses in the nature of mutiny or related
thereto, out of a total number of offenses of 12,472, it is plain that
the number of such convictions is extremely small; and it must be
inferred that the commanding officers were not seeking relentlessly for
offenses that could be characterized as mutiny, and that the offenses
actually characterized as such were offenses which well deserved the
name. From June, 1917, to June, 1918, when the Regular Army and
National Guard together consisted of less than 300,000 men, the total
number of convictions for mutiny was 43; and yet with an Army of 10
times the size, the number of convictions for mutiny increased only
one-fifth. It seems obvious that the practice of courts-martial during
the year of the war could hardly justify a reproach of severity for
the offense of mutiny.
(8) Disobeying standing orders (Table I, No. 8)-This offense
is punishable under the Articles of War by such sentence of imprisonment as the court-martial may direct. The direct number of convictions
for this offense was 208; the average sentence is 1.96 years; for 12 per
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cent of the sentences no period of confinement was imposed; for 60.58
per cent a confinement of less than 2 years was imposed; 10.58 per
cent of sentences were between 5 and 10 years; the rest scattering in
other periods. In view of the maximum limit permitted to the discretion of the court under the Articles of War, and in view of the variety
of circumstances effecting the nature of this offense, it can not be said
that the tendency of the courts has been to severity.
(9) Disobeying an officer (Table I, No. 9)-The offense of disobeying a superior officer is punishable, under the Articles of War, by
"death or such other punishment as the court-martial may direct"; it
is covered by the same article of war that deals with assault on a
superior officer, but obviously it should usually rank as an offense of
lower grade. The total number of convictions for this offense was
785; the average sentence was for 4.34 years; 6 per cent of sentences
were punished by imprisonment; 43.69 were punished by confinement
of less than 2 years; and a trifle over 50 per cent were punished by
some period greater than 2 years, there being 1 death sentence and 18
sentences for 25 years or more. It will be noticed that the average
sentence for this offense was almost identical with the average sentence
for the offense (No. 4 above) of assaulting a superior officer, and
that in both cases a little less than 50 per cent of sentences were for
periods of confinement less than 2 years. But these two offenses were
treated differently with respect to the sentences for higher periods;
the bulk of the long-termed sentences for assaulting an officer lying
between 5 and 10 years, while for the offense of disobeying an officer,
they were spread out over the periods between 3 years and 25 years
or more. 'Comparing the absolutely unlimited nature of the punishment permitted by the Articles of War to be imposed by the courtmartial, and observing, that 50 per cent of these sentences were for
periods of under 2 years, it can not be said that the tribunals appear
to be seeking to exercise the maximum of severity allowable, but
rather the contrary.
Moreover, in interpreting these sentences for the offense of disobediefce of an officer, it is worth while to remind the civilian public
that little or nothing turns upon the nature of the command itself
which is disobeyed. Much has been made in public discussion of
one or two sentences in which the subject of command was apparently
of trivial consequence; for example, a command to an enlisted man
to give up some tobacco unlawfully in his possession, or a command
to clean a gun. But in military life, obviously it is not the thing
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commanded that is material; it is the act of deliberate disobedience.
Deliberate disobedience in one thing, if unchecked, means deliberate
disobedience in any and all things. It was a condition of deliberate
disobedience, in small and great things alike, which caused the Russian Army to melt away and transformed Russia into the home of
Bolshevism. The military officer does not rule by violence, but by
moral sway. He is able to organize his men upon the battlefield
only because he can be confident that every command of his in matters great or small will result in instant and unquestioned obedience.
Hence, an act of military disobedience is a symptom as alarming to
the military commander as is the first incipient cancer cell to the
surgeon-a warning that knife must soon be applied. The War
Department must invoke and expect the sympathy and support of
an enlightened public in realizing that the offense of disobedience is
to be ranked among the cardinal offenses of the soldier and requires
the most rigid measures for its repression.
This completes my survey of the sentences for the nine principal
military sentences.
In the foregoing comments it will be noticed that, since a charge of
excessive severity implies the habitual resort to a maximum standard
allowable under the law, the sfandard here to be taken must of necessity be the standard set by the Article of War as adopted by the act of
Congress. Judging by this standard, the practices of the court-martial,
to any candid observer, must be vindicated from the charge of the
habitual employment of severity; rather have they proceeded in a direction of a lenient use of their discretion.
But the mind naturally seeks to test this issue of severity by any
other accepted standard that may be available, apart from the intangible standards of individual notions. There appear to be two and
only two such other standards available. One is the standard to be
gathered from former practice in the Army; the other is the standard
to be gathered from civil courts. Neither of these is entirely ppropriate; but it is my duty to see what light can be thrown by them upon
the present subject.
(A) Former practices of courts-martial-Unfortunately the
records available in the printed reports of former years are but scanty
in their application to the present purpose. No data as to the length
of sentences have been published in the former reports of my office,
except in the report for the fiscal year 1917-18, and then only for the
offense of desertion. Taking these data for such light as they may
give us (Table XIV, page 31, Report of the Judge Advocate General,
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1918), we find that the length of sentence did increase gradually during that year. The figures are as follows:
TABLE II-DEsERTON

Month

1917

Convictions

Average
months' conTotal months' finement (total
confinement
months' congiven as part
flnements
of the sendivided by
tence
sentences
imposed)

15

3

48

August .......................

8
17

27

276
560

September ....................

44

1,604.75

56

2,521.75

22.5
38.21
45.85

203
202
202
228
19.4
224

9,057
8,925
13,088.75
16,906
19,109
24,399

48A3
50.14
6925
79.75
99.53
112.96

. 1,553

104,051.25

71.02

M ay ..........................
June ..........................
July ..........................

October .......................
November ....................
December .....................

1918
January ......................
February .....................
March ........................
April .........................
May ..........................
June ..........................
Total ......................

52
93

540
1,863
5,153

34.5
52.94

36.53
57.26

It will thus be seen that the average sentence for the year ending
June, 1918, was almost exactly six years, as compared with an average
of 7.58 years for the period October 1, 1917, to September 31, 1918,
and that the average of six years for the period May, 1917-June, 1918,
started at between two and three years for the first seven months of
the war, and then rose steadily until it was reaching nine years in the
fifteenth month of the war.
I do not pretend to be able to interpret the significance of this
gradual rise in the average length of sentence for the offense of desertion. So many conditions are involved that any one of several hypotheses may account for the circumstance. I content myself with
pointing out, as a possible explanation, the principles already quoted
from Brig. Gen. Oakes in his report on desertion in the Civil War,
viz., it is quite possible that the military tribunals began with an
extremely low penalty, but that as the training of the new forces proceeded in camps a general impression obtained that the protection of
the Army against the spread of desertion required a somewhat more
stringent penalty.
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As to any other offenses than desertion, and as to any periods
prior to June, 1917, it is not now feasible to ascertain what were the
standards of courts-martial sentences in peace-time practices. But inasmuch as a condition of war transforms the whole situation for military discipline and puts into effect the strictest standards of military
behavior, it is not possible to presume that the sentence length imposed
in former peace-time practice would afford a suitable standard for
comparison with war-time practice.
(B)
Standard gathered from civil courts-Here it will be necessary to depart from the list of principal military offenses, which have
no counterpart in the civil courts, and to resort to the principal civil
offenses represented in the military records. The criminal statistics of
the United States are but imperfectly organized for study, and the only
available record for the present purpose that could be found, after extensive search, is the report of the Director of Census for 1910,
entitled "Prisoners and Juvenile delinquents in the United States."
Table 42, at page 64, sets forth the variance in periods of sentences
imposed for the various civil offenses. Setting these side by side with
the sentences imposed for the corresponding offenses by military courts
during the year ending September, 1918, the result is shown in the
following Table III.
In this Table III the percentages are the significant items. Oh
the whole, it appears that the percentage of long sentences is greater in
the military courts than in the civil courts. For example, in the
offense of forgery the sentences of 10 years and over were 15.7 per
cent of all spntences, while in the civil courts they were only 3.3 per
cent; the sentences for 5 to 9 years were 28.3 per cent, while in the
civil courts they were only 11.3 per cent.
But this general trend is marked by so many exceptions that it is
hardly open to any general conclusions. For example, in perjury the
military court gave a sentence of under one year for 64.3 per cent of
the cases, while the civil court gave its lowest sentence in only 28.9
per cent of the cases. Similarly for burglary the military court gave
its lowest sentence in a larger percentage of cases than did the civil
court. So, too, turning to the highest sentence, it appears that murder
and manslaughter received less severity of sentence in the military
courts than in the civil courts; for murder only 41.7 per cent were
sentenced in military courts to the death penalty or life imprisonment,
while in the civil courts 86.9 per cent received such penalty; and
similarly for manslaughter the percentages of sentence of life imprisonment or imprisonment of 10 years or over or imprisonment from
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5 to 9 years were only about half as large as the perentages of the
same sentences in the civil courts.
Moreover, it must also be remembered that the moral heinouness
and danger of even these civil offenses, common to both codes, varies
TABLE

ITT-SENTENCES

Offense.

Forgery ......

FOR CIVIL OFFENSES IN MILITARY AND CIVIL COURTS COMPARED

Court.

Military...
Civil .....
Military...

Perjury ......

Total.

"number
223
er cent
100
number 1,290
ercent
100
number
14
100
er cent
128
number
100
percent
number
162
100
per cent
number
487
100
percent
number
117
percent
100
number
904
percent
100
number
1,025
100
lber cent
number 19,136
100
ercent
15
number
100
ercent
763
number
100
per cent
15
number
100
percent
671
number
100
per cent
29
number
100
percent
number 4,925
100
percent
30
number
100
ercent
235
number
1O0
ercent
24
number
100
ercent
937
number
100
ercent
33
number
100
percent
number 1,437
100
percent

I Life or
death.

10years
land over.

35
15.7
43
3.3
1
0.8
22
13.6
7
1.4
42
35.9
192
21.2
89
8.7
120
0.6
4
26.7
181
24
1
6.7

to 9 12
to4l
5years.
years.

63
28.3
146
11.3

3
2.3
Embezzlement Military...
31
19.
Civil ......
22
4.5
Robbery ..... Military...
34
29.1
Civil ......
2
205
0.2
22.7
Larceny ...... Military...
131
12.8
3
393
Civil......
2.1
17
Rape..
2
Military ...
13.3
46.6
238
174
Civil....,
5
23.1
Gambling .... Military ...
3
20
1
civil......
0.1
4
Burglary ..... Military ...
8
13.8
27.6
7
227
750
Civil ......
0.1
4.6
15.2
Threats to do
4
5
bodily harm Military.
13.3
16.7
1
Civil ...
0.4
310
4
Murder ...... Military...
2
41.7
16.7
8.3
4814
109
3
Civil ......
86.9
11.7
0.3
Manslaughter. Military...
57
5
21.2
15.2
724
520
419
Civil ...
1.6
36.2
29.2
16 hanged. 23 death. 32 hanged, 2 commuted. 4118 death. 53 migitated.
Civil ......

more or less in military life and civil life.

69
30.9
569
44.1
2
14.3
38
29.7
36
22.2
76
15.6
28
23.9
229
25.3
237
23.2
1,970
10.3
1
6.7
149
19.8
1
6.7
7
*1
7
24.1
2,015
40.9
5
16.7
2
0.9
2
8.3
7
0.7
69
27.2
341
23.7
61

1 to 2
years.

Unde'
1 year

36
16.1
209
16.3
9
64.3
37
28.9
50
30.9
265
54.3
10
8.5
143
15.9
380
37
14,014
73.2
1
6.7
117
94
15.5
12.6
10
66
20
643
95.9
3
3
7
10.4
24.1
1,062
864
21.6
17.6
13
3
10
43.3
14
218
92.7
6
3
3
12.5
12.5

20
9
323
25
3
21.4
49
38.3
23
14.2
117
24
3
2.6
133
14.7
188
18.3
2,636
13.8

4
0.4
6
18.2
18.2
97
36
2.5
6.8
mitigated. 75 death.

Larceny, for example,
which to the civilian mind never receives the deepest measure of
reprobation among'property offenses, has long been deemed through-
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out the rank and file of the Army as an intolerable offense, for the
safety and mutual confidence of military intimacy as fellow soldiers
becomes impossible unless every soldier can be assured that his few
and precious belongings can be safely left unguarded in his restricted
quarters. In those sections of our country where the horse has always
been indispensable to every man's daily occupation, the offense of
horse stealing is visited with penalties which seem grossly severe to
the residents of other communities; indeed, so far has this principle
been carried that in one Southwestern State noted for its splendid
horses the law (unless it has been recently changed) permits the
owner of a horse to shoot the horse thief while in the act of running
away with the property, a privilege not accorded by the law of any
other State. It is undoubtedly due to this sentiment that in the
table above the offense of larceny is found to be visited with sentences of more than two years in percentages considerably in excess
of the percentages found in the sentences of civil courts.
I mention the foregoing instances only as a preface to the general
suggestion that the use of longer terms of sentences in military courts
than in civil courts for some of the above civil offenses may well be
explained by the exigencies of internal military life and by the habitual
standards of military conduct known to all soldiers, rather than by any
disposition on the part of military tribunals to impose heavier sentences for offenses of an identical nature.
I must freely admit that, in any discussion of the severity of sentences, notions of severity are so widely different that it will be
hopeless to satisfy the standards of all varieties of 6rifics. There
exists today, in some minds apparently, a sentimentality towards
offenders of every sort, which we could never expect to satisfy without
a virtual undermining of the entire criminal law, whether military or
civil. I received recently a letter, complaining of the "inhuman and
outrageous punishments administered for trivial matters"; this expression being used of a court-martial sentence of ten years for conspiracy to rob. In the particular case, four soldiers, out on leave in
a city adjacent to a military camp, assaulted with a pistol and violently beat a fellow soldier at midnight in a vacant lot, for the purpose of obtaining his money by force; and upon his raising an
outcry they ran away, and his wounds were attended to by the military police. To apply the term "trivial" to this act of cowardly
violence, and the term "inhuman" to the sentence of ten years, indicates such a singular standard of moral judgment that it would be
impossible to reach an agreement, in estimating the severity of the
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sentence, with those who are willing to acknowledge such a standard
of judgment. I am assuming, in what I have now to say, that the
idea of severity is hways to be interpreted in the light of a rational
standard of moral judgment based upon the danger and heinousness
off the offender's act in comparison with the sentence imposed.
I close this comment with a forceful quotation from a recent
editorial in a leading daily journal:
When a soldier goes absent without leave, deserts his post of duty to
see a dying father, he does so because his own personal desires are strongei
than his sense of responsibility to his country. It may be a hard thing to
give up seeing a dying father, but it is a harder thing to give up running
away in the face of the enemy.
That is what military justice *isabout. The sole preoccupation of any
army, wherever it is, is to frain its men and keep them trained to obey the
will of the commander under the most trying possible circumstances and
serve the will of the Nation. If disobedience had been tolerated in the
United States, our Army in Europe would not have captured the St. Mihiel
salient nor fought six weeks in the Argonne.
An army to be successful in the field must, from the moment it begins
to train at home, have absolute control of its discipline.
I close this part of my letter, therefore, by noting that the general
practices of courts-martial, judged by the maximum sentences allowable by the military code, must be deemed not to merit the charge of
excessive severity and that, in my own opinion, they rather merit the
opposite characterization.
This general condition of things, however, I repeat, must, of
course, be sharply discriminated from the question of the excessive
severity of*a particular sentence measured in the light of the circumstances of the individual case. That is a question totally irrelevant to
the judgment to be passed upon the propriety of the practices of
courts-martial in general, as judged by their average treatment of the
offenses coming before them.
(b)
The reasons for the severe group of sentences. The quesstill
be asked, however, whether even for these serious milition may
tary offenses those sentences greater than, let us say, 5 or 10 years
were necessary for the morale of the Army.
I must premise by pointing out first that these long sentences
represent only a minute fraction in the mass of court-martial sentences, and, secondly, that the long periods of years named in those
sentences were only maximum, and were therefore nominal only.
As to the first point, I call attention to the total number of sentences for a year, including trials in all grades of courts. These were
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approximately 240,000, of which the military offenses were at least
200,000 in round numbers. In these 200,000 sentences the vast
majority, probably about 185,000, were imposed in summary courts,
arid those could not by law exceed three months. Another 10,000
approximately, were in special courts, and those could not have exceeded six months. Some 7,000 were in general courts, the only
court authorized to impose a sentence of higher than six months.
Now, for the year October 1, 1917, to September 30, 1918, the records
of this office show that there were only 532 sentences for a period
of 15 years or more; that is, less than three-tenths of 1 per cent of
the over 200,000 trials for military offenses. And there were only
about 2,200 sentences for five years or more, or a trifle more than 1
per cent of the 200,000 sentences for military offenses. If, therefore,
anything is found to be wrong about this group of severe sentences,
the wrongness can only affect a very small fractional corner in the
area of military justice. There may be at this moment 532 cases
of smallpox in the population of the metropolis of Manhattan, with
more than 4,000,000 inhabitants; but this does not signify that there
is any doubt as to the general health immunity of the metropolis
against that plague.
The second point above mentioned is that these long periods of
years named in the sentences were in effect nominal only. There
being no minimum number of years, the offender may be released
at any time by reduction or remission of sentence on recommendation
of the clemency section of this office, where the offense is a purely
military one. That this is not merely a possibility, but an actuality,
will be seen from the fact, later to be cited, that nearly 10 per cent
of the 12,000 sentences of the last calendar year have in fact been
selected for remission or mitigation, and that in those sentences an
average of 90 per cent of the total periods has been cut off; for example, of the 2,035 sentences for desertion, some 577, averaging a
sentence of 3.80 years, were selected for reduction, and this average
was reduced, on the recommendation of my office, to an average of
three months. In other words, the imposition of a 25-year sentence
does not signify that 25 years of a sentence will be served; the experience of the year 1918 having shown that of the sentences selected
for reduction only 10 per cent of the term is actually served. It is
in this sense that I refer to these long-term figures for the maximum
duration as merely nominal.
As an illustration conveniently at hand, let me take the four cases
cited by Senator Chamberlain as illustrating excessive severity of

ENOCH 11. CROWDER
court-martial sentences; he cited the case of a 25-years' sentence for
absence without leave; another of 15 years for the same offense, and
two cases of 10 years for sleeping on post. And yet the records of
this office show that in two of these four cases the Judge Advocate
General had advised that there was no legal objection to their restoration to duty, on December 10 and December 12, 1918, respectively,
two weeks or more prior to the date of the Senator's speech in Congress; and the records of the Adjutant General's Office show these
men actually restored to duty on December 23, 1918, one full week
before the day when the Senator arose to complain of the severity of
these cases; and all of this in the course of the normal operation of the
system. These illustrations point to what I mean in saying that the
long term named in the sentence is merely nominal, in that the
offender may be, and in practice frequently is, restored to duty at an
early period of a few months or more, totally regardless of the long
period named in the sentence.
Why then (it ma'y be asked) was it necessary or wise to name
such long maximum terms in the sentence? The answer here must be
sought in the necessities of discipline while our Army was being
raised, and in the just apprehensions of resporisible officers over the
fulfillment of their huge task. Half a million men were taken by
draft in 1917, fresh from the associations of civil life; nearly another
half million were entering by enlistment; and before three-quarters of
the year 1918 had passed nearly four million men had been taken
into the Army and were in process of training. This training was
conducted under circumstances of urgent haste never before known
in our history-for the tide of battle was going against the allies, and
the anxieties of the civilized world awaited breathlessly the arrival of
our troops. To make good soldiers out of this huge and undisciplined
mass, in an q erage period of three or four months for each contingent,
was one of 'the most extraordinary feats ever accomplished in the
history of military training; and it has testified in the highest degree
to the adaptability and versatility of the American character. But
it required urgent baste, and while it was going on the curtain was
not raised upon the future, and the glorious results which now lie
before us were still in the realm of doubt.
Our officers, charged with the duty of bringing these undisciplined
men into immediate readiness for battle, were weighted with anxiety,
day and night, at the possibilities of failure. The one imperative
necessity was to inculcate the sentiment of obedience-obedience instant and absolute. For those few-and they were less than 15,000
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out of 4,000,000--who committed serious military offenses, and thus
showed themselves recalcitrant to the requirements of military discipline, some form of absolute moral compulsion was necessary. Whether
that moral compulsion ought to take the shape of a sentence of 2
years or 10 years or 20 years was a matter about which it would
have been dangerous to speculate. The situation called for an absolute certainty. The sentences must be such that they imposed for
any disobediently disposed soldier a penalty which would be absolutely compelling. When those officers selected occasionally *(and
the percentage of cases was extremely small) a long-term sentence
which should have this imperative significance, they knew that this
was only a maximum term and that there was no minimum, and that
an early release would be easily earned by those who deserved it.
And I can not bring myself today, nor, I think, can any man who will
reflect on that situation, to question now the wisdom of their judgment. And I will even go so far as to say that probably none
of these officers supposed for a moment that these long terms
would ever actually be served. It was their business and duty to
impose a compelling sense of discipline, and they chose those terms
which, in their judgment, would do so. And it was not for them to
undermine the effect of their discipline by announcing that none of
these sentences need be served a moment longer than the exigency of
the war required. They knew that, if the danger should pass and if
victory should crown their efforts, the authorities of the Army, and
particularly the scrutiny of my office, would see to it that the sentences were appropriately cut down. And I think it can be safely
asserted that, so far as there is anywhere an individual long-term sentence that could have been deemed excessive, the man who received
that sentence has not yet served a single day of the excessive period.
In other words, if an individual injustice was done in the tength of
period imposed, the injustice was never one which could not be corrected before it became in fact an injustice.
How thoroughly my office is now undertaking to apply this corrective in proper cases I will later mention. But I am concerned
now, in these days of international safety and of national demobilization, to carry back in retrospect the minds of all reflecting citizens
to the period of 1917, when the fate of the world trembled in the
balance and the embryo armies of the United States were the hope
of civilization for turning that balance in the direction of world
rescue. The huge responsibility of preparing these armies almost
over night lay upon these men who administered military discipline.
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How magnificently they discharged that task has been shown by the
results of the battle field. I, in common with all other intelligent
citizens, shared their anxieties, and I for one can not 'now remain
silent while they are criticized for the conscientious exercise of that
judgment in applying the necessary measures. Had they failed, they
might have been put to the bar to account for themselves. But they
succ'eeded, and in a manner which has commanded the admiration of
the world's veteran soldiers. It is easy to be wise after the fact.
But n the light of their superb success let no one now censoriously
presume to disparage the soundness of their judgment nor the wisdom
of the measures by which they achieved that success.
(c) Pending mitigation or remission. I said above that I would
coriclude this part of my comment by mentioning the measures now
practically under way for mitigating and remitting the sentences of
courts-martial, in the light of the termination of hostilities and the
restoration of the national safety.
On the 20th of January you approved a recommendation of mine,
dated January 18, proposing the institution of a system of review for
the purpose of equalizing punishment through recommendations for
clemency. A board of three officers was designated by me in the
Office of the Judge Advocate General on January 28. This board of
officers, with a large number of assistants, is now examining the
record of every sentence of courts-martial under which any soldier is
now confined iffany prison in the United States. The recommendations of this board will go so far as to remit the entire portion not
yet served upon a sentence of confinement or to reduce it to such
amount as seems suitable to the present situation in view of the
necessities of military discipline. It is expected that at least 100
cases a day will be passed upon by this board. The completion of the
work of this board, which can not require more than a few months
at the most, will signalize a complete readjustment of all sentences in
a manner appropriate to the teftnination of hostilities and the resumption of peace-time requirements for military discipline. It is
certain that every sentence that might now be deemed in excess of
the necessary period will be duly reviewed and that no soldier now in
confinement will serve any period in excess of that just amount, so
far as human powers of judgment are equal to this task.
II. ' VAIIABILITY OF SENTENCES
When we come to the question of variability of sentences, we
reach a "subject which has been the fertile field for complaint and
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criticism in civil courts for a century past. It is notorious that the
independent judgment of different courts and of different juries seems
to be characterized by the most erratic and whimsical variety. Such
has been the constant burden of complaint in civil justice, and it can
hardly be hoped that military justice could escape a similar complaint
in some degree. On the other hand, it must always be remembered
that here the individual circumstances vary so widely that a variation of sentences is perfectly natural, and that the mere variation of
figures in itself signifies very little where the individual circumstances
remain totally unknown to the critic. Nevertheless a variability of
sentences for the same offense is something which naturally excites
attention and caution; and it should be the object of appellate authorities to equalize the penalties for the same offense where no
obvious reason for substantial difference is found. How far the revisory authority of the Judge Advocate General and the clemency
powers of the Secretary of War have been effectual to secure such
equalization will be noted later in this letter. At the present the
inquiry of fact is whether there has been such variability and at
what point it has taken place.
The table above referred to, and already handed to you, summarizes for the nine principal military offenses the variance of the sentences, first by months of the year covered, and secondly by jurisdictional areas from which the court-martial records come up for revision. In summary of these variances it is here to be noted that such
variances obviously exist; that these variances are not in themselves
any more striking than those that are found in the sentences of civil
courts, as already shown in the other table submitted to you; that
in seeking the possible source of these variances it appears very
strikingly that there has been a slight but appreciable increase in the
number of higher-period sentences as we come down to the later
months of the war; and that, so far as jurisdictional areas are concerned, there have been notable variances which seem in some cases
to localize the higher-period sentences for certain offenses in certain
specific areas.
As illustrating the foreging inferences it will be sufficient here
to take the single offense of desertion.
Examining it by months it will be noticed that the long-term sentences of 10 to 15 years, and of 15 to 25 years, and over 25 years
increased slightly in their ratio to the whole of the sentences for the
month as we approach the later months of the year under examination.
For example, for the months of October, 1917, to February, 1918,
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there were no sentences over 25 years,, although the number of convictions increased from 55 to 196 (the increase, of course, being due to
the much greater ratio in the increase of armed forces). But during
the months of April to July, with approximately the same number of
convictions, averaging 225, the number of sentences for over 25 years
increased from 4 to 9, to 15, and finally to 33. Apparently, therefore,
some conditions in the Army changed as the months advanced so as
to induce this variance in the direction of higher-period sentences.
Just what those conditions were can not even be the subject of speculation without a very careful inquiry; merely the fact is here pointed
out.
Again, turning to the jurisdictionalareas, we find that the Central
Department shows about 9 per cent of sentences for over 10 years,
while the Eastern Department shows only 3 per cent; that the Twentyeighth Division, having 21 convictions, imposed no sentences in excess
of 10 years, while the Eightieth Division, with exactly the same number of convictions, imposed 14 sentences greater than 10 years.
As further indicating this variance by jurisdictional areas, a
glance at the same table under the offense of absence without leave,
shows that, in the Twenty-eighth Division, which exhibited the above
leniency for desertion, the offense of absence without leave was
given a sentence of under 2 years for 127 out of 140 convictions;
while the Eightieth Division, which had shown a large majority of
long-term sentences for desertion was, on the other hand, lenient
for the offense of absence without leave, imposing 16 sentences of
under 2 years, out of 20 convictions. Comparing again the Thirtysixth and Thirty-ninth Divisions, with substantially the same number of convictions, viz., about 175, one finds that the former imposed
about 20 sentences of above 10 years, while the other imposed 101
sentences above 10 years. This same Thirty-ninth Division had also
used a majority of higher period sentences for desertion, whereas
the Thirty-sixth Division showed for desertion a record that averaged with the other divisions.
It will be seen, therefore, that in many, if not in most cases, the
extreme variances may be traced to difference of practice in the
different jurisdictional areas. Just what conditions existed which
would justify in the individual case, or in the general trend of cases,
this variance between divisions, can hardly be the subject even of
hypothesis. But it must be obvious to any candid observer that
there do exist wide differences of conditions, not only in the racial
and educational make-up of the different camps, but also in the
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morale and necessities of discipline prevailing in different camps.
It is well known that the sentences of civil courts for civil offenses
vary widely in the different States. For example, in 1910 (Census
Report, 1910, "Prisoners and Juvenile Delinquents," p. 50), the percentage of sentences of 10 years or over was 9.7 in the East South
Central States, but was only 0.1 in the New England States; in
Mississippi, it was 22.51, but in California it was only 2.3. This
illustration is mentioned merely to suggest that whenever one discovers that variances in sentences have a certain relation to variances
in camps or divisions, the subject becomes at once too complex for
hasty judgment.
Apart from what is now being done in my office by way of the
equalization of sentences by commutation in the way of clemency,
I am only concerned here to point out the facts as they are found in
the records relative to the action of the courts-martial themselves;
and to note that such variances (apart from peculiar individual cases)
as are revealed in any noticeable amount, seem to be due most largely
to differences of conditions in the different camps, divisions, and other
jurisdictional areas; and the greatest caution must be exercised before
passing judgment upon such variances as inequitable, without being
fully familiar with the conditions operating in those places.
Moreover, I must utter a further caution against the popular presumption that a difference in sentences of different individuals for
the same offense signifies necessarily any inequity. The individual
circumstances differ so widely that the injustice would consist, not in
the variability, but in the rigid identity of the same sentence for the
same offense in every individual case. This very matter of variation
in sentences is one of the triumphs of modern criminal law. One
hundred years ago virtually every criminal code of the civilized
world was marked by a rigid fixation of penalties for each variety
of offense. It was regarded as one of the great objects of criminal
reform in that era to introduce variability of the sentence and adapt
it to the circumstances of the individual case. One of the first criminal codes to introduce this reform was that of the State of Louisiana,
drafted just a century ago by the great Edward Livingston, recognized as the most eminent jurist of his day; this code received the
approval of the jurists of the world; and one of its most remarkable
features was its recognition of the variability of sentences for varying
individual circumstances. Ever since that day all progress in criminal
codes has included this element in an increasing degree. The particular virtue claimed and proved for the indeterminate sentence, which
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has now been adopted in probably three-quarters of the States of our
Union, is that it gives full play for the adaptation of the sentence to
the individual case. We must, therefore, always recall that the variability permitted by law is in itself a powerful feature tending to the
apportionment of justice according to the circumstances of each case.
The one complementary element necessary in a criminal code in
guarding against too great a variability in the action of different
courts is the power of ultimate readjustment by some central tribunal.
In the language of one of the very Senators who has criticised some
of these sentences:
The sure cure for it all is to have some sort of a tribunal, appellate or
supervisory, that shall have the poxNcer to formulate rules and equalize these
unjust sentences. * * *

Precisely this power of recommendation is now exercised, and
long has been, by the Judge Advocate General's Office, in its clemency
section. The explanation of this activity brings me to the next
point of criticism.
III.

MITIGATION

BY CLEMENCY

RECOMMENDATIONS

IN

THE JUDGE

ADVOCATE GENERAL'S OFFICE

The distinct implication running through the critical remarks
above quoted is that there exists no central authority that can check,
equalize, or correct such severity or variability as may be found to
merit such action, and that the Judge Advocate General's Office,
charged with the duty of revising these court-martial records, either
acquiesces in the result of the court martial sentences as approved by
the reviewing authority or makes no attempt to check any revisory
action.
It is, therefore, necessary to emphasize that the judge Advocate
General's Office not only scrutinizes the court-martial records for the
purpose of discovering errors of law and procedure, but also, in the
Clemency Section of the Military Justice Division, occupies itself
exclusively with the scrutiny of records for the purpose of recommending for remission or mitigation those sentences which are open
to question as to severity or inequality. This power has been exercised habitually ever since our entrance into the war, as well as before
that date.
Inquiring into the results to see what the facts show the question
presents itself: To what extent has the Judge Advocate General's
Office called for a reduction of sentences by a recommendation of
clemency to the Secretary of War? And I note in passing that in no
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instance, so far as I am informed, has such a recommendation of
clemency failed to be approved and given effect by yourself.
The extent of such recommendations as to number of sen(1)
tences will be found by taking the total number of sentences for all
offenses classified by length of term, noting the number of these sentences recommended for reduction by clemency by the Judge Advocate
General's office, and then reckoning the percentage of offenses of each
length thus reduced. This gives the following results:
TABLE IV-DISTRIBUTION OF SENTENCE REDUCTIONS BY JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S OFFICE, ACCORDING TO LENGTH OF ORIGINAL SENTENCE
Total sentences, by
length of
terms, for 9
principal milltary offenses,
Oct. 1, 1917, to
Sept. 30, 1918

Sentences recommended by
Judge Advocate General's
Office for reduction, 9
principal military offenses, Jan. 1 to
Dec. 31, 1918

Number

Number

Per cent

Total .........................

7,624

947

12.42

Below 2 years .................
2 to 3 years .................
3 to 5 years.................

3,886
483
482

330
174
135

8.49
36.02
28.00

1,064

197

18.51

626
373
159

68
33
10

10.86
8.84
628

5 to 10 years .................

10 to 15 years .................
15 to 25 years.................
25 years or more ..............

The important thing to notice about the table is that it shows 12
per cent of the total sentences to have been reduced by clemency exercised on recommendation of the Judge Advocate General. I see no
reason to doubt that this 12 per cent is ample enough to cover all the
individual cases in which an excessive severity would have been apparent on the face of the record.
The above table shows the reduction in its relation to the sentences of different lengths. The table shows that the largest percentage of reduction occurred in the sentences of .medium length, and that
the smallest percentages of reduction occurred in the sentences of
shortest and of longest periods.
This result is perfectly natural and appropriate. The shortest sentences are those in which there would be the least call for reduction by
clemency on the ground of excessive severity. The longest sentences
are those in which the reduction on the ground of excessive severity
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would presumably not bring them to an extremely low period and
therefore in which the time for recommending such reduction had
presumably not arrived.
(2)
How niuch total reduction did this action effect in the
total length of all the sentences acted upon? This will afford some
gauge of the thoroughness of the action in the nature of clemency.
Table V below shows the number of sentences recommended for reduction, the total years of the original sentences, the total years reduced on recommendation of the Judge Advocate General's office, and
the net years of sentence as actually served. The figures are given
for the nine principal military offenses, as well as for the total of
all offenses:
TABLE V-REDUCTIONS OF SENTENCES RECOMMENDED BY CLEMENCY DIVISION, JUnGE ADVOCATE
GENEI A's OFFICE, ACCORDING TO AMOUNT OF REDUCTION, JANUARY 1, 1918 TO DECEMBER 31, 1918

Offenses.

Number
of courtmartial
sentences,
Oct. 1,
1017, to
Sept.S0,

Number of sentences recom- Years of original Total years reduced
mended by
sentence in cases on recommendation
JudgeAdvoeate
selected for
of Judge Advocate
General's office recommendation.
General's office,
for reduction,
Num-

1918. ber.

Total offenses ...............
Desertion ..................
Absence without leave .......
Sleeping on post .............
Assault and attempt to assault
Mutiny ....................
Disobedience, disrespect, disloyalty ...................
Disobedience of regulations.
Disobedience of orders .......
Miscellaneous, forgery, larcency, ....................

12,472 1,147

Per
cent.

Number.

Average.

Number.

Net years of
sentence
as served,

Percent Total Averon col.
3. years. age in
years.

Per
cent
of
averages

9.20 4,331.28 3.78 3,876.69 89.50 545.59 0.4010.50

2,025 577 23.49 2,193.49 3.80 2,056.56
3,362 112 3.33 361.67 3.23 313.72
609 63 10.34 187.08 2.97 150.14
173 34 19.65 1135.00 3.97 108.09
51
10 19.61 49.00 4.90 46.81

93.76 136.93
86.74 47.95
80.25 36.94
80.07 26.91
95.53 2.19

.24 6.24
.43 13.26
.5919.75
.7919.93
.22 4.47

1,404
208
1,196

151 10.75 567.17 3.75 454.57 80.15 112.60 .75 19.85
46 22.16 192.75 4.19 116.07 60.22 76.68 1.6739.78
105 8.78 1374.42 3.57 338.50 90.41 35.92 .34 9.50

4,848

200 4.13

837.87 4.19 746.80 189.13 91.07

.46110.87

Referring to the table for details as to the specific offenses, I
will point out here merely that for all offenses, military and. civil,
total reduction effected was a reduction of 3,876 years out of an
original period of 4,331 years, or a reduction of 89Y2 per cent. In
other words, action of this office, in effecting reductions in the 1,147
sentences selected on their merits for reduction, cut them down to
10.50 per cent of their original amount. Presenting the same result
in another form, the average original sentence, of these 1,147 sen-
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tences, was for a period of 3.78 years (or nearly 4 years), and the
average sentence served as reduced was only 0.40 of one year, or less
than 5 months.
These figures, as to reduction effected in the length of the sentences, demonstrate that the action of this office was a radical one,
and must have served to eliminate any excessive severity in those
sentences. That the sentences selected for such recommendations of
clemency included all of the sentences meriting the term "severe,"
neither I nor anyone else would be in a position either to affirm or
deny without an examination of every record.
How extensive is the scope of reduction now undertaken for all
sentences, by the special clemency board recently appointed at your
instance, has already been told.

